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Foundations of the Workfare State – Reflections on the
Political Transformation of the Welfare State in Britain
Christopher Deeming
School of Geographical Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
Abstract
The British ‘welfare state’ has been transformed. ‘Welfare’ has been replaced by a new ‘workfare’
regime (the ‘Work Programme’) defined by tougher state regulatory practices for those receiving
out-of-work benefits. US-style mandatory community work programmes are being revived and
expanded. This article, therefore, considers shifting public attitudes to work and welfare in Britain
and changing attitudes to working-age welfare and out-of-work benefits in particular. It also
considers the extent to which recent transformations of the state may be explained by declines in
traditional labourist politics and class-based solidarity. Thus, we attempt to develop a richer
understanding of changing public attitudes towards welfare and the punitive regulatory ‘workfare’
practices engaged by the modern state in the liberal market economy; reflecting on the nature of the
relations between ideology, party policies, popular attitudes and their political impact.
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Introduction
The contradiction is that while capitalism cannot coexist with the welfare
state, neither can it exist without the welfare state. (Offe : , original
emphasis)
This article considers how far patterns of change in British public attitudes
to work and welfare, and the apparent shift from ‘welfarist’ to ‘workfarist’
values, may be explained by declines in traditional labourist politics and
class-based solidarity and the repositioning of the British Labour Party regard-
ing welfare in the s. Drawing on trend data from the British Social
Attitudes (BSA) survey (e.g. Park et al. ), the first section examines the
transformation of the British ‘welfare state’ (q.v. Wincott ) and the rel-
evance of social attitudes in the policy process, before describing the study
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methods and results. Solidarity with unemployed citizens, poor people and
welfare claimants has declined significantly in recent times. In the final
section, we reflect on the possible meaning of this finding for the development
of economy and society in Britain in the st century, particularly with the
new punitive conditions being imposed by the Conservative-led coalition’s
‘Work Programme’, which seeks to establish a new self-fashioning ‘workfare’
regime. Originally theorized over four decades ago (Piven and Cloward ),
workfarist regimes, in the modern-day context, regulate labour, in essence, by
enforcing work (particularly low waged and insecure work that has charac-
terized the post-industrial labour market) while residualizing state welfare
services (cf. Peck ).1 Consequently, the article helps to shed new light on
the relations between ideology, party policy, public opinion and public policy.
Transformations of the British Welfare State
The historic trade-off between ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ in the industrialized
world was, arguably, the ‘welfare state’ – a compromise of political parties and
power resources in the democratic class struggle (e.g. Pelling 	; Thane

). Throughout much of the th century, the original emphasis of social
policy was on the protection of working-class families within the capitalist
state. The reforms initiated by the Liberal government in Britain after 	,
for example, enacted non-contributory means-tested old age pension legisla-
tion () and social insurance for unemployment risks (), as well as
sickness. Further reforms by the Labour government, following the Beveridge
Report (Cmd 	

 
), included family allowances (
), the scheme for
social security (
	) insurance and assistance (
) to help protect workers’
incomes from unemployment risks, a national health service (
	), pensions
(
), and Keynesian principles for full employment and active government
policy for managing the economy effectively. The main objective of the
Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) was to provide security, and it relied heavily
for revenues upon income taxation and contributions from national insur-
ance. This reliance, financed largely by the working population, had impor-
tant consequences for the distribution and redistribution of income across the
population and life course, conferring benefits on those deemed unable to
secure adequate living standards through the private market. Thus, the
Beveridgean welfare state was totally dependent upon unemployed workers
actively seeking and returning to work. When the risk of male breadwinner
unemployment was largely cyclical in the industrial economy, out-of-work
benefits were expected to provide a short-term stopgap buffer for workers
between jobs. In the post-industrial economy however, characterized by struc-
tural unemployment and labour market uncertainty, the KWS faced new
challenges.
By the late s and early s, the KWS was in crisis, with a global
political backlash against state intervention in the market. Open competitive
economies required labour market flexibility and supply-side intervention, not
Keynesian demand management. The shift in the s and s from the
KWS to the Schumpeterian Workfare State, essentially placing the market
before state and society, is well documented (Jessop ). The role of the state
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was redefined in order to secure labour market participation under the
heading of ‘activation’. New training programmes and strategies were devised
to promote employability (as long-term unemployment can deskill) and to
increase the job-readiness of unemployed workers (Paz-Fuchs ). This
approach aligned with the goal of workfare: not simply to reduce unemploy-
ment but also to tackle the wider cultural problem of ‘worklessness’. The
policy paradigm has therefore firmly shifted away from protecting incomes in
favour of welfare conditionality and activation, as the workfare state in Britain
attempts to enforce work for all.
Workfare policies introduced by the UK coalition government, including
the new punitive ‘Work Programme’ (Cm  ), are designed to solve a
problem about the effects of ‘passive’, social citizenship rights-and-eligibilities-
based welfare.2 This problem arose, it was argued, because too many citizens
had been reduced to ‘welfare dependency’ (Wiggan ). Supporters of
activation argue that the new conditions impressed on welfare benefit ‘claim-
ants’ – roles and responsibilities, duties and obligations – are perfectly and
morally justifiable as the social contribution now owed by citizens to society
(Mead ). Labour exchanges have long helped to solve the problem of
economy and subjectivity, as Rose () observes, but in the workfare state,
the ‘jobcentre’ takes on new significance in ‘activating’ the labour power of
workers.
Activation policy in the UK is now actively moving more people off welfare
and into paid work; the effects are being felt across the different groups of
benefit claimants, including people with a disability or health condition, single
parents and two-parent families with children (table ). Under the new sanc-
tions regime (Welfare Reform Act ), claimants are no longer exempt from
looking for paid employment (unless they are deemed to be lead carers or are
deemed unable to work after a medical assessment).3 Harsher sanctions have
been introduced to help to ensure that jobseekers comply with the new
workfare regime. To maintain eligibility to benefit support, jobseekers must
actively look for paid employment or face benefit sanctions; they must take up
any offer of paid employment or face sanctions; and they must undertake all
specified work preparation activities demanded or face sanctions (table ). If
Table 
Workfare conditionality in Britain
• Group : Full conditionality: jobseekers; all work-related requirements apply.
• Group : Work preparation: people with a disability or health condition who have a
limited capacity for work.
• Group : Worked-focused interview: lone parents or lead carer in a couple with a child
aged one to four; keeping in touch with the labour market.
• Group 
: No conditionality: people with a disability or health condition which prevents
them from working; lone parents, or lead carers with a child aged under one.
Source: SSAC : 
.
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conditions are not met, claimants can now find their benefits suspended for up
to three years. New options are also available for mandating ‘work-shy’
claimants into unpaid work. Welfare recipients deemed to be lacking an
adequate ‘work ethic’ (or those who display work-aversion tendencies) now
face ‘Mandatory Work Activity’. This is an important development in light of
the assertions made by Jobcentre Plus (JCP) staff that the vast majority of
people claiming out-of-work benefits are not interested in working for a living
(Dunn ). Adapting to the demands of changing circumstances, the state
has become much more active in regulating the behaviour of citizens, gov-
ernment is about ways of conducting conduct after all but the issues involved
are not solely about ‘legitimacy’. Conditionality has always been a part of the
Beveridgean welfare state but the intensification of work-conditionality raises
a number of interrelated normative and empirical questions for social policy
that are discussed elsewhere (Deeming a; Whitworth and Griggs ),
particularly concerning the ethics of work-conditionality for different groups
of benefit claimants and the use of ‘evidence’ used to drive through ideologi-
cally motivated workfare reforms. Much of the empirical evidence emerging
from the ‘Work Programme’ evaluations seems patchy at best, and auditors
report poor returns on investment for the British taxpayer.
We might well argue that the new techniques of statecraft being introduced
to manage the economy and society are made possible only if they achieve a
real level of public acceptability and ‘legitimacy’ in democratic politics and
policy processes (Kumlin 
). Public opinion is politically important in
terms of justifying changes to the social security system (Griggs and Bennett
) and, while the British public may be concerned about rising inequality
and the needs of the very rich, they seem to manifest less concern for people
on low incomes (McKay ; Rowlingson et al. ). Nevertheless, ‘social
problems’ such as ‘poverty’ and ‘unemployment’ and measures for addressing
them are constructed and represented by policymakers for policy-making
(Stevens ; Wiggan ). Thus, ‘welfare dependents’ and ‘jobseekers’ are
a particular category of the population whose conduct is increasingly gov-
erned by the state’s coercive powers through such moral ‘problematizations’
of individual character (Dean , ).
The power of myth both encourages and hinders our understanding of the
social world, famously documented by Richard Hoggart () and more
recently by Dean (). Increasingly, the media report stories about the state
failing to ‘look after us’ or claiming that welfare has become a ‘soft touch’ for
‘scroungers’ and the ‘lazy’, ‘benefit cheats’ or ‘welfare tourists’ – all of which
undermines trust and weakens collective solidarity for the principles of social
protection. Similarly, politicians now capitalize on the promise to ‘make work
pay’ for the ‘hardworking majority’ of striving ‘middle-class’ voters (Parker
). The government creates and reinforces distinctions along the work/
non-work axis in policy and rhetoric. State benefits are now said to support
the ‘shirkers’ (living on benefits has become a ‘lifestyle choice’, it is claimed),
a narrative that reflects, at least in part, contemporary prejudice against
working-class citizens. Low-skilled workers, for example, face a different and
altogether higher risk of unemployment than the nation’s ‘strivers’. Stories in
the popular press capture the imagination of members of the public, unem-
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ployed citizens are branded ‘skivers’ who ‘free ride’ on the actions of others in
society, it is claimed, especially relying on the endeavours of the ‘hardworking
majority’.
In the empirical analysis, we therefore examine welfare attitudes in British
society at the aggregate level, but we also require a better understanding of
attitudes defined by traditional indictors of welfare allegiance, such as social
class and identification with political parties.
Methods
The most reliable and consistent source of survey data on public attitudes to
social welfare in the UK comes from the BSA (Park et al. ). This nationally
representative, repeated cross-sectional survey (described in more detail in the
Appendix) has explicitly set about capturing public views on issues relating to
welfare services in Britain annually since . Thus, it offers a sound basis for
investigating the relationships among social attitudes and welfare provision in
Britain. In the context of recent policy developments, we are particularly
interested in public attitudes towards unemployment protection and social
security benefits that aim to alleviate poverty. The BSA, for example, solicits
views about benefit levels for unemployed people, asking respondents to judge
whether out-of-work benefits are too generous or too low and could cause
hardship. Further questions ask whether benefit levels discourage unemployed
workers from finding paid work and whether the conditions placed on claim-
ants and jobseekers are too weak to secure successful ‘back-to-work’ outcomes.
The survey asks respondents to consider whether unemployed people in their
area could find paid work if they wished, thus tapping into the extent to which
the public subscribes to either individual or structural explanations for the
causes of unemployment. The survey also solicits views about welfare spend-
ing on poor people more generally and asks whether the social security system
itself is a priority for extra public expenditure. The focus throughout is on
attitudes towards work and welfare, and income security for the working-age
population. Attitudes towards retirement incomes and benefits, for example,
or public services such as healthcare are tasks for another day.
In the analysis, we employ a range of descriptive statistics and multivariate
regression techniques, including logistic regression for survey responses in
binary form (Hosmer and Lemeshow ). Using the core questions and
variables relating to welfare and work, we consider long-term attitudinal
trends and views defined by class and allegiance to political party (restricted to
the three main political parties in British politics, Liberal, Labour and Con-
servative). As Crompton () observes, ‘social class’ remains a contested
concept in the social sciences. In this analysis, we are forced to rely on
occupation (which provides a good indication of class and employment rela-
tions), adopting the standard occupational classification scheme applied to
social surveys in Britain (Rose et al. ). According to this perspective, classes
are aggregations of positions within the labour market. In Britain, we observe
the following class structure: traditional higher professional occupations (	 per
cent of the British working population belong to the professional class); the
managerial and technical ‘white-collar’ roles (one-third of the British popula-
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tion in employment belong to this class); one-fifth of workers are in skilled
non-manual occupations (the lower-middle-classes). Turning now to the
working-class, or working-classes, about one-fifth of the working population
are in skilled manual occupations. Fifteen per cent of workers are in semi-
skilled occupations and  per cent of the working population are unskilled
labourers, the smallest category. The reduction of class to occupation threat-
ens to leave out of the model those citizens who are ‘unemployed’ (the
benefit-dependent group), and those citizens who are ‘economically inactive’:
the retired population, students or unpaid family carers. In the analysis,
however, other socio-demographic variables are included to produce a
multifactoral approach to class and social relations (including labour force
status, see table ).
Multivariate logistic regression models are used to assess the socio-
economic and demographic characteristics that help to explain or predict
attitudes to welfare provision in the national population. BSA explanatory and
outcome variables are shown in table . The odds ratios in the results tables
(tables  and 
) show the strength and the direction of the independent
predictors, and asterisks indicate the level of significance (‘independent’ here
means after taking account of all of the other demographic and socio-
economic variables in the model). Much of the discussion focuses on the
multivariate results in table , with cross-referencing to the interaction effects
for class, education and political party allegiance shown in table 
. All study
calculations are weighted to correct for differential and non-response bias in
the survey data.
Results
Descriptive analysis
The social survey evidence points to a fundamental shift in public views on
welfare provision over the past three decades. In figure , we find – through-
out much of the s and s – a widespread belief that out-of-work
benefits were set at such derisory levels that they caused significant hardship
for people living on them. In 	, for example, 
	 per cent of the British
population said that out-of-work benefit rates were too low. By , that
figure had peaked at  per cent (figure ).
Then at the start of the st century, a distinct attitudinal shift begins to
emerge. People no longer accept that benefit levels are inadequate: only one
person in five said they were set too low in  – just  per cent of the British
population. Congruent with this trend is the growing popular belief that the
standard of living for claimants on welfare is too high. Generous benefits are
now seen to discourage work and encourage ‘welfare dependency’. According
to the latest data, 	 per cent of the British population now believe that
out-of-work benefits are too generous and promote the ‘dependency culture’
that is now seen to exist in the UK. Attitudes towards unemployed people are
clearly changing and hardening fast. The attitudinal trends reported in
figure  are all the more striking when we consider their economic context.
The real value of unemployment benefit in Britain has changed very little over
©  John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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this period (if anything, there has been a marked decline against average
earnings, figure ). Many working-class families struggle to manage on ben-
efits that are kept below any social standard of decency in order to strengthen
the incentive to find work in the growing number of low-paid, low-skilled jobs
that involve poor-quality work (Shildrick et al. a).4 With the growth in
Figure 
Public attitudes to unemployment benefits in Britain
Source: BSA –.
Figure 
The real value of unemployment benefits in Britaina
Source: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).
Note: a = average gross weekly earnings and unemployment benefits inflation adjusted from
 to  (in April  prices).
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casual and temporary (non-standard) employment, many families are now
trapped in a cycle of low pay/no pay poverty as citizens move in and out of
the labour market.
The visibility of the reaction against social protection for women and men
of working-age increases with the addition of the linear trend lines, as shown
in figure . The trend lines help to expose the clear and growing divergence in
the attitudinal survey data and the popular drift away from support for better
welfare (because benefits are too meagre and cause hardship) towards the now
popular belief that they are, in fact, too generous and thereby encourage
‘welfare dependency’. There is significance in the point of intersection in the
diverging trend analysis, seen around the year . In the approach to the
 general election, the Labour Party was making the case for active labour
market policies, a feature of its general election manifesto (Labour Party ).
Tony Blair now spoke about actively reforming the welfare system, under
Labour ‘welfare will be a hand-up, not a hand-out’, he declared (Blair ).
Following communitarian thinking, Labour now argued that a good society
combines respect for individual ‘rights’ with the principle of ‘reciprocity’, that
members must accept responsibilities for their families and the wider com-
munity at large (Gilbert 
). The ‘New Deal’ policies, introduced by Labour
in , set out the workfare strategy, which emphasized that welfare would
now be more clearly defined by labour market participation and mandatory
work-related activities. In British social policy terms, the ‘New Deal’ schemes
represented a radical ideological departure from the traditional role of social
security, which had hitherto focused on redistributing provisions to support
those without work.
Our interest in the analysis concerns the public standing of welfare intu-
itions, questions over ‘legitimacy’ and ‘trust’ arise. In figure , we see the
Figure 
Percentage of the British public reporting unemployed citizens could find a job if they wanted
Source: BSA –, three-year moving average.
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number of people who believe unemployed workers and benefit claimants
could find work if they really wanted to has steadily increased over the study
period. Over half the population now say claimants could find work if they
wanted, compared to a quarter in the early-s. Activation workers (JCP
staff) also mistrust claimants, who they generally consider and label ‘work-shy’
(mentioned earlier). Thus, it could be argued that the new punitive policies
currently being implemented by the coalition government are a necessary
response to the ‘legitimacy crises’ of the welfare state. New policies must look
to address the individualized pathologies of the ‘dependency culture’, if indeed
it exists in Britain on the scale that some politicians would have us believe
(research suggests the ‘culture of worklessness’ thesis is overstated in the UK,
see Shildrick et al. a), but policymakers certainly must do more to tackle
social and labour market disadvantage.
Unemployment continues to be a real and persistent risk facing workers
(particularly low-skilled workers) in the advanced economies (OECD ). In
the UK, we also find generational and regional divides in opportunities to find
paid work (Whitworth ). Increasingly, however, the survey data suggest
declining solidarity with unemployed citizens; perhaps those in employment
care much more about their own job security than the unemployment of
others, or perhaps most British citizens no longer recognize or accept unem-
ployment risks themselves: risk is increasingly concentrated at the bottom of
the class structure, after all. In the growing climate of distrust, it is also possible
that more affluent citizens may be content to abandon collective forms of
social protection. The pursuit and understanding of security has increasingly
become an ‘individualized’ if not altogether private matter. Self-insurance and
individual adaptability to labour market risks are the only options that remain
in the face of declining solidarity. Remarkably, negative attitudes towards
unemployed workers continued to hold firm with the economy in recession
during – and – (figure ). Such well-formed opinions are likely a
reflection of the continued ‘moralising’ over the ‘social problem’ of persistent
unemployment. The media tends to blame, shame and stigmatize unem-
ployed people and welfare claimants (Taylor-Gooby ; McEnhill and
Byrne 
). Citizens who fail to secure paid work are the social differentiated
‘other’ (not-me) it seems; once again defined as the ‘undeserving poor’
members of British society as Coats () observes.
Attitudes towards welfare benefits for poor families appear broadly consis-
tent across the classes. The distribution of views according to class found in
 is broadly similar to that seen in , albeit at a much lower level
(figure 
). In , 	 per cent of working-class respondents said government
should spend more on welfare benefits for poor families, compared with about
half of middle-class respondents. In , only one-third ( per cent) of
working-class respondents agreed that the government should spend more on
welfare benefits for poor families (a decline of 	 percentage points),
compared to one-quarter of middle-class respondents. The fall in the mid-
s is a likely response to New Labour repositioning itself during this period.
‘Third Way’ reforms replaced welfare with workfare. It appears that tradi-
tional Labour voters followed the direction of their party on this issue, adopt-
ing some of New Labour’s values (Curtice ). The shift in political
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discourse – and the ‘Third Way’ politics associated with Tony Blair – proved
popular with the electorate and working-class voters. Under Blair, Labour
went on to win its second and third consecutive victories in the  and 
general elections; however, the longer-term costs to collective welfare services
and unemployment protection are only now becoming apparent. Social secu-
rity is now less of a public priority than it was in the early-s, and marked
class differences in support of additional social security spending are dimin-
ishing (figure ). By , we find that just 	 per cent of working-class repre-
sentatives and just  per cent of middle-class voters regard social security as a
priority for government spending.
In figure 	, we see that supporters of the Conservative Party are the least
likely to perceive that government should provide better welfare benefits to
help poor families; Labour Party supporters have traditionally been the most
likely to hold pro-welfare-state values, compared to supporters of the Conser-
vative or Liberal Parties. However, we also observe that support for welfare
among Labour voters has been in steep decline over the last two decades. In
, for example,  per cent of Labour Party supporters agreed that the
government should spend more on welfare benefits for poor families, com-
pared with just over one-third (	 per cent) in  (a decline of 	 percentage
points). Among Conservative voters, support for collective action to alleviate
poverty has been relatively low in comparison and the decline over the two
decades more gentle (figure 	). The extent to which the long-running down-
ward trend will continue as we approach the  general election remains to
be seen but a reversal of the trend seems most unlikely, given the direction of
workfare policy in the UK. In the next section, we seek to model explicitly
Figure 

Percentage of the British public reporting the state should spend more on welfare benefits for
poor people, defined by classa
Source: BSA –, three-year moving average.
Note: a = ‘Middle Class’ includes professionals and routine non-manual workers, and
‘Working Class’ includes skilled, low-skilled and unskilled workers.
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Figure 
Percentage of the British public reporting the state should make social security a priority for
extra spending, defined by classa
Source: BSA 	–, three-year moving average.
Note: a = ‘Middle Class’ includes professionals and routine non-manual workers, and
‘Working Class’ includes skilled, low-skilled and unskilled workers.
Figure 	
Percentage of the British public reporting the state should spend more on welfare benefits for
poor people by political party identification
Source: BSA –, three-year moving average.
©  John Wiley & Sons Ltd
SOCIAL POLICY & ADMINISTRATION, VOL. 49, NO. 7, DECEMBER 2015
	

some of this heterogeneity in welfare attitudes to understand the changing
nature of welfare provision in Britain.
Multivariate analysis
Regression models are used to explain or predict attitudes to social security
provision in the national population. Negative views appear widespread, but
some members of society may be more critical of welfare than others. Here we
want to identify more clearly those who claim that out-of-work benefits are too
generous, those who think that unemployment benefits disincentivize paid
work, and those who believe that work conditionality in the welfare system is
too weak.
In the results (table ), we observe the importance of age, gender, ethnicity,
education, labour force status, household income, occupational class, alle-
giance to political parties and region of residence in shaping public attitudes
towards social protection for the working population. Age influences views
about welfare. Young adults (aged –
), for instance, are significantly
more likely than older adults to believe that out-of-work benefits in Britain
are set too high (table : Model a). Other things being equal, the odds of a
person aged –
 years claiming unemployment benefits in Britain are too
generous are more than three times greater than for an older person aged 	
or above. It is fascinating to learn that young adults are taking a tough stance
on welfare compared to older adults, given that they are arguably experienc-
ing the brunt of the social reforms relative to social protection policy in later
life for pensioners.
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and housing benefits could be withdrawn for
the under-s who are not in work, education or training under new proposals
announced in  by Prime Minister David Cameron.6 Around one-fifth of
young adults (aged 	–
) are unemployed, well over twice the national
average. Young adults are also more likely to believe that work conditionality
in the British welfare system is weak, as are adults aged –

 years (table :
Model a). The relative odds of a young adult reporting the social security
system suffers from weak conditionality is more than three-and-a-half times
greater than an older person aged 	-plus. Men are  per cent more likely to
believe that benefits are inadequate, compared to women. Ethnicity also
appears to shape attitudes towards the welfare state. Belonging to a black and
minority ethnic (BME) group also significantly increases the relative odds of
reporting that out-of-work allowances in Britain are too generous (table :
Model a) and deter claimants from working (table : Model a). Citizens
from BME backgrounds, for example, are twice as likely to say that state
benefit levels are too high and are nearly three times as likely to say that
they disincentivize paid work, compared to the majority ‘White’ British
population.
Education is an important predictor of welfare attitudes. Citizens with low
education are significantly more likely to be dissatisfied with the British social
security system than those with higher levels of educational achievement.
With educational attainment below the level of university degree, for example,
the relative odds of someone asserting benefit levels are too generous are 
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Table 
Multivariate model results showing the relative odds of reporting the British social security
policy is not fit for purpose
Model a Model a Model a
Generous Benefits Work Disincentive Weak Conditionality
Age
–
 .
* . .	***
–

 . .
 .	

–
 . .	 .
–	
 .	 .	 .
	–
 . . .
+ . .	
 .
Gender
Female . . .
Male .	* . .
Ethnicity
White . . .
Black and minority ethnic .* .	** .
Education
Degree . . .
Below degree .** .*** .
No qualification .** 
.*** .
Labour force status
Unemployed . . .
Employed 
.	*** . .***
Economically inactiveα .** . .**
Income quartile (£-month)
 (<£,) . . .
 (£,–£,) .* .

 .
 (£,–£,) .* . .

 (>£,) .

*** .	 .	
Class (occupation)
Professional .
* . .	*
Managerial .
* . .
Skilled non-manual worker . .
 .

Skilled manual worker .* . .
Semi-skilled worker .
 . .	
Unskilled worker . . .
Trade union
Member . . .
Non-member . .	 .
Political party affiliation
Liberal Democrat . . .
Labour . . .

Conservative 
.*** 
.*** .***
Religiosity
Not religious . . .
Religious . . .**
Region
North East . .	 .
North West .
 . .
Yorkshire & Humberside .* . .
East Midlands . . .
West Midlands . .
 .
South West .
 . .
Eastern .	 . .
Inner London .
*** .* .

Outer London . . .
South East . . .
Wales . .	 .

Scotland . .	 .
Notes: significance levels: * = <., ** = <., *** = <.; α = economically inactive covers the retired population,
students, unpaid family workers and citizens engaged in home duties and child care.
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per cent greater than for those with a university degree. People with educa-
tional attainment below university degree level are also  per cent more
likely than graduates to believe the current benefit system is a disincentive to
paid work. Those without formal qualifications are twice as likely as graduates
to report state benefit levels are too generous (table : Model a), even though
this group is most at risk of unemployment. They are also four times more
likely than those with a degree to say benefits act to deter paid employment
(table : Model a). There is also a clear income effect in the data. The higher
the level of household income, the more likely a person is to believe that
out-of-work benefits are too generous.
Class appears to be an important contributory factor here, but the ‘trade
union effect’ is surprisingly weak, after controlling for all of the other variables
Table 

Main effects model with interaction terms
Model b Model b Model b
Generous
benefits
interactions
Work
disincentive
interactions
Weak
conditionality
interactions
Class x educationα
Professional x degree .	 .
 .
Professional x below degree . .	 
.

Managerial x degree .** .** .
Managerial x below degree . . .*
Skilled non-manual x degree . .* .
Skilled non-manual x below degree .
 	.** .	
Skilled manual x degree .* 
.*** .*
Skilled manual x below degree .** 
.	
*** .
Semi-skilled manual x degree . .** .	
Semi-skilled manual x below degree . . .

Class x political partyb
Professional x Conservative 	.** .*** .***
Professional x Labour . .	
 .	
Managerial x Conservative .	*** .		*** .***
Managerial x Labour . . .
Skilled non-manual x Conservative .** .*** .	*
Skilled non-manual x Labour . . .

Skilled manual x Conservative 
.** 	.*** .**
Skilled manual x Labour .
* . .
Semi-skilled manual x Conservative .	* 	.** .	
Semi-skilled manual x Labour . . .
Notes: significance levels: * = <., ** = <., *** = <.; reference categories: α =
unskilled worker without qualifications, b = unskilled worker voting Liberal Democrat.
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in the model. People in professional and managerial occupations, for instance,
are nearly three times as likely to believe benefit levels are too generous,
compared to unskilled labourers. Professionals are also significantly more
likely than unskilled workers to say the social security system suffers from weak
conditionality. Skilled manual workers are three times more likely than
unskilled manual workers to believe out-of-work benefits are too generous, but
not skilled ‘white-collar’ workers. The interpretation is clear. Compared to
skilled manual workers, who find it easier to maintain continuity of employ-
ment in better paid roles, low-skilled workers (if they are employed) are more
likely to experience precarious employment and non-regular work, including
casual and temporary employment. Job insecurity and the experience of being
pushed out and pulled into the labour market are defining features of pre-
cariousness in modern societies, as Shildrick et al. (b) observe. Labour
force status is also a particularly strong determinant of attitudes towards
welfare after controlling for other factors. Compared to unemployed adults,
for example, people in paid employment are five times as likely to say that
welfare benefits are too generous (table : Model a) and they are three-and-
a-half times more likely to believe that the conditions placed on claimants are
too weak to secure successful back-to-work outcomes (table : Model a).
Citizens who are economically inactive (covering those who have retired
from the labour force or people involved in home duties) are also signifi-
cantly more likely to say that unemployment benefit levels are too generous
and the conditions placed on jobseekers are too weak, compared to adults
claiming out-of-work benefits. Social security against the adverse effects of
unemployment is clearly of value to the British citizens who are protected (at
least in part) by social policy.
Partisanship helps to account for welfare attitudes. People who vote for the
Conservative Party are significantly more likely to believe that out-of-work
benefits are too generous, compared to citizens who vote for the Liberal
Democrats (table : Model a). They are more likely to say that the social
security system fails to properly incentivize work (table : Model a) and that
conditionality is too weak (table : Model a). The relative odds of a Conser-
vative voter saying that benefit levels are too high are nearly five times greater
than for a Liberal or Labour voter. Conservative voters are also four times as
likely to say that welfare deters paid employment and are twice as likely to
believe that workfare conditionality in Britain is too weak, compared to
citizens who vote for the Liberal Democrats (suggesting Cameron’s new
‘Work for the Dole’ policy, discussed later, will appeal to the Conservative
Party faithful).
Religious beliefs have some impact; people with religious views assert that
the new workfare conditions attached to benefits are too harsh (table : Model
a). Lastly, we observe some spatial patterning in the survey data. People
living in central London, who experience a high cost of living and will bear the
brunt of the new Housing Benefit cap, are significantly more likely than
people living in Outer London to say that benefits are inadequate and,
as such, do little to deter paid work. People living in Inner London, for
example, are four times more likely to believe benefit levels are inadequate,
compared to people living in Outer London. People living in Yorkshire are
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also significantly more likely to say that benefits are inadequate, compared to
the Outer London reference group.
Interactions
Next we test for interaction effects in the survey data (by specifying interaction
terms in the main model). We are interested in the additive effects of belong-
ing to a particular class, combined with educational attainment and allegiance
to the political parties (while continuing to hold all of the other variables
shown in table  constant). In table 
, we observe strong interaction effects
between occupational class and level of education attainment and between
class and partisanship. For example, skilled manual workers with qualifica-
tions are now three-and-a-half times more likely to believe state benefits are
too generous, compared to unskilled labourers with no formal qualifications
(table 
: Model b). We also find that many of the interactions between class
and education (table 
: Model b) are now significant, beyond the results
obtained for class and education in table  (the additive model). Skilled
manual workers and non-manual skilled workers with qualifications are now
significantly more likely to believe that state benefits deter paid work than
unskilled workers without qualifications. We also observe strong interaction
effects between class and allegiance to the Conservative Party. Other things
being equal, the relative odds of a professional who votes Conservative believ-
ing state benefits are too generous are now 	 times those of an unskilled
worker who votes for the Liberal Democrats. The odds of a Conservative
voter asserting that state benefits deter paid work are now five times greater
than a Liberal voter, and the odds of them reporting the benefits system is
undermined by weak conditionality are now three times greater. Generally,
voting Conservative increases the odds of reporting that the social security
system is not ‘fit-for-purpose’ across all of the occupational classes (i.e. table 
:
Models b–b).
Discussion
‘Work’, it is claimed, is ‘the best form of welfare’ for people of working age in
the modern economy (Cm  ). For paid work helps to promote both
individual fulfulment (other things being equal in the society of unequals) and
collective social well-being in the capitalist market economy (Deeming b).
Work helps grow the economy and eases pressure on welfare: employment
maximization is now the conventional wisdom of policymakers. But, concep-
tions of ‘work’ and ‘time’ that are only valued in or by the market for growing
the consumer economy are increasingly at odds with the new challenges
facing societies. There is a pressing need to move beyond the imperative of
today’s growth-based society, where many meaningful activities such as caring
for others go unnoticed and are under-valued in the drive for increased labour
productivity, towards a more just degrowth economy based on improved
human well-being and social equity (Coote and Franklin ).
With the turn to workfare policies and ‘supply-side’ measures that
problematize individual agency (with a particular focus on the lower class and
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weakest members of society), however, policymakers appear to have lost sight
of important structural and economic drivers, and employment constraints. In
the process, politicians are actively failing to engage the public on important
issues of social policy: the problem of persistent ‘structural unemployment’,
labour market fluctuations and labour market inequalities, the lack of jobs
(particularly in some areas), the lack of ‘decent work’ (which is not just about
‘paid employment’) more generally (Dean ). Some groups have higher
unemployment rates than others: policymakers have clearly misunderstood
the complex structural causes of youth unemployment (with unemployment
levels amongst young adults at record highs of  per cent in the UK).
Policymakers can no longer ignore particular issues facing single parents
(work–life balance and childcare are among them), in-work poverty (especially
among working families with young children), and the social insecurity of
people who cannot find work in the open labour market (adequate social
protection can help to reduce poverty and this is part of the unresolved
contradiction between the human right to welfare and the realities of human
suffering created by government policies that tolerate poverty and exclusion).7
In the political circumstances, fundamental changes in the dominant social
values in Britain may not be a surprise, as they are evidenced by the declining
solidarity with unemployed citizens and the growing lack of concern for the
material hardships faced by unemployed workers and people living on low
incomes than there was  years ago when the BSA first began. The findings
also point to a growing lack of ‘trust’ in the population. Most people now
firmly believe that JSA claimants could get a job if they really wanted one. The
 recession dented this long-term trend somewhat but not substantially.
The survey findings suggest a fundamental shift in views on the underlying
causes of unemployment. The survey data clearly reveal a departure from
societal or structural explanations for unemployment towards individualist
interpretations with an emphasis on human agency. The British public
now sees work aversion and the declining ‘work ethic’ as one of the main
issues facing society. Coupled with this trend is a growing belief that
out-of-work benefits are now too generous and act to promote the ‘depen-
dency culture’. This view is widely held, despite evidence to suggest the real
value of unemployment benefit in Britain has changed hardly changed over
the past 
 years.
Some of the largest attitudinal shifts have occurred among sections of the
British population that have traditionally supported the principles of the
welfare state: Labour voters and representatives of the working-class. Declines
in support for welfare amongst Labour voters are particularly marked. The
findings for ‘social class’ (defined by occupation) are perhaps more curious.
The figures show significant declines in working-class support for collective
welfare insurance to protect workers from unemployment risks, a possible
reaction to ‘scroungerphobia’, as working-class citizens attempt to dissociate
themselves from popularized notions of the ‘undeserving poor’ (Shildrick and
MacDonald ). On closer examination, however, we find a more gradated
field of class relations, with different (but recognizable) stratifications of
unemployment risk reflected in the survey data. In the regression analysis, we
find that only manual workers in skilled occupations – about one-fifth of the
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working population – now believe that benefits levels are too generous. Other
things being equal, unskilled and semi-skilled workers currently make no such
assertions. Low-skilled workers who experience greater job insecurity appear
to have a stronger desire to see the welfare safety net more securely woven to
protect their living standards in the event of unemployment.
A number of more general conclusions can be drawn from the British
experience. First, we can observe the changing point of political gravity
towards the right. ‘Third Way’ ideas have moved the ‘traditional’ left to the
centre – welfare policies of the centre-left have become similar to the centre-
right. There now appears to be a growing political consensus around the
merits of the workfare project, a recognizable attempt by the state no less to
settle capitalism’s contradictions and the (ongoing) legitimacy crisis of the
(welfare) state (Offe 
). Here we may also draw attention to the role of
political discourse and the actions of political parties in shaping public atti-
tudes in the policy process, leading to the growing acceptance and likely
embedding of workfare values and principles in the collective psyche. British
public attitudes appear to have followed the logic of government policy.
Labour supporters, in particular, appear to have accepted the workfare line
promoted by Labour under Blair. The present Conservative-led coalition
government has pursued further workfare reforms and reductions in welfare
spending with little political or public opposition. Second, there appears to be
a new and more divisive type of ‘welfare politics’ emerging in Britain and
other advanced liberal democracies (Deeming c). In the political contest
for votes, workfare ideology not only divides workers but also further
depoliticizes the relationships between capital and labour in the process.
Policy representations by political parties and divisive politics played out in
the media are implicated, as is the objective situation whereby workers
compete for shares of a diminished pie of scarce resources. Recent scholarship
(Nolan et al. 
; Piketty 
) reminds us that, as more of society’s resources
are distributed upwards to the wealthy members of society, the middle
stratum of skilled workers (manual and non-manual) compete with low-skilled
labourers and unemployed workers at the bottom of the class structure.
The Conservatives under Cameron are very much on the side of ‘hard-
working people’ (their political slogan at the  Party Conference) and now
seek to extend the principles of workfare on social justice grounds. New
mandatory work conditions will apply to long-term unemployed people.
‘There is no option of doing nothing for benefits’, claims the Chancellor,
George Osborne, ‘no something-for-nothing any more’.6 Under the ‘Work for
the Dole’ programme, those in receipt of JSA will be required to give some-
thing back to their community in order to maintain eligibility to benefit
support: making meals for older people, clearing up litter, or working for a
local charity are among the options currently being discussed (such workfarist
regulatory principles can be traced back to the postwar period, particularly in
the USA, see Mencher 	; Piven and Cloward ). Whether ‘Work for
Benefit’ policies represent a responsive ‘thermostat’ (Herbst ) gauging
the temperature of public opinion or a ‘weathervane’ (sensing the shift)
is not altogether clear. In other words, will the political project ‘workfare’
gain momentum? Will the British public accept or demand more workfare
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measures in response to what policymakers are doing – or fewer? Particularly
telling, however, is that the Labour Party has mounted little opposition to
the latest welfare reforms and certainly offers no prospect of reversing the
workfare trend as we approach the next British general election in . In
response to new voter demands, Labour no longer appears to promote the
interests of ‘labour’ (including unemployed workers and those people precari-
ously employed), but instead seeks to attract the votes of ‘hard-working fami-
lies’ and remains committed to raising their living standards. (The term
‘hard-working families’ appears to have entered the political lexicon in the
UK during the  election, appearing in Labour’s manifesto, Labour Party
.) The notion of ‘hard-working’ citizens is not simply a rhetorical device
aimed at a political constituency – middle-class voters. It reflects a range of
normative assumptions about the way in which life should be lived in st-
century capitalist society. Work is seen as the best form of welfare, not only
because work pays better than welfare but also because it promotes partici-
pation, inclusion and well-being. Thus, ‘workfare’ policy follows a certain
economic and political (but socially divisive) logic, with the main political
parties in the UK appealing to the same political constituency. The challenge
for social policy, as Rueda () argues, is to overcome such ‘dualizing’
processes and ‘dualistic’ political tendencies that inhibit the development of a
more inclusive society. A few preliminary thoughts on how we might actively
pursue this agenda for change follow.
Limitations and future research
The majority of the British public now believes that life on out-of-work
benefits has become too easy and that the British social security system may
need (further) reform. Whether the opinion polls amount to anything other
than market-testing for the effects of political rhetoric is unclear. Certainly,
this is a criticism that could be levelled at the BSA data. Respondents may not
be informed about the issues at stake: they may have little experience of
budgeting on benefits, for example, or may not be aware of the actual sums
JSA claimants receive in benefit.
It appears that the British public favours social security reform, but again,
with current survey data, it is not altogether clear how we should interpret the
public mood. The public may prefer to see social insurance principles reas-
serted in British welfare policy, rather than US-style mandatory work pro-
grammes. Labour recently announced plans to strengthen the link between
contributions and benefits, which they hope will restore public faith in collec-
tive insurance against unemployment to provide a decent standard of living
above the means-tested minimum safety net (the British social security system
has a much weaker contributory element than many other countries such as
Germany for example, see Clasen, ).4 The reciprocal principle (which is
the basis for public support for the welfare system) has always been strong in
British social policy, from Beveridge’s early report, ‘benefit in return for
contributions, rather than free allowances from the State, is what the people
of Britain desire’ (Cmd 	

 
: ). Unfortunately, however, this is unlikely
to help the many carers and the growing numbers of people now leading
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precarious and uncertain lives, trapped in the cycle of low pay/no pay poverty
under the ever-watchful eye of the punitive (workfare) state.
Further research might therefore explore some of the issues emerging from
the present analysis. We need to know whether (or the extent to which) the
BSA is capturing or reflecting real and deep-seated value changes. Qualitative
inquiry is likely to prove the more reliable option for this task. Qualitative
research might also consider the prospect of restoring or strengthening the
contributory principle in Britain’s system of welfare, and the ethicality of the
Conservative’s more radical American-style community work programme.
Lastly, there are limits to the value of cross-sectional surveys, such as the BSA
survey, in terms of understanding how individuals themselves change their
views in response to government policy. Panel surveys (such as the UK’s
‘Understanding Society’) capture this dynamic; they can shed more light on
those individuals who have consequently accepted that there is no alternative
to workfare policy. Comparative analysis may shed further light on the social
structure of attitudes to welfare, and provide a deeper understanding of the
relations between ideology, political parties, public opinion and public poli-
cies. This is a topic that merits further investigation.
Appendix
British Social Attitudes Survey
The BSA survey series has been conducted annually since . Each year
over , interviews are conducted with a representative sample of adults
aged  or over. Participants are selected using a technique called random
probability sampling. The sampling method involved a multi-stage design,
with three separate stages of selection:
• Selection of postcode sectors, 	 postcode sectors with probability pro-
portional to the number of addresses in each sector.
• Selection of addresses, 	 within each of the 	 sectors.
• Selection of individuals, using a computer-generated random selection
procedure.
This sampling technique ensures that everyone has a fair chance of taking
part in the survey and the results are representative of the British population.
Since , the sampling frame for the survey has been the Postcode Address
File (PAF), a list of addresses (or postal delivery points) compiled by the Post
Office. For practical reasons, the sample is confined to those living in private
households. People living in institutions (although not in private households at
such institutions) are excluded, as are households whose addresses were not on
the PAF.
The BSA has covered an extensive number of complex social, political and
moral issues. Topics include work, transport, health, education, government
spending and voting habits, as well as religion, racism and illegal drugs. New
areas of questioning are added each year to reflect current issues, but all
questions are designed with a view to repeating them periodically to chart
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changes over time. The BSA includes a series of standard questions on
political party affiliation and political values. Regarding ‘social class’, the BSA
employed the Goldthorpe-Heath class scheme up to , and the National
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification class scheme from .
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Notes
. In many ways the current trend towards a disciplinary workfare state implies
continuity in state-administrative practices and the government of poverty in the
UK (see Mencher 	; Dean ). Britain’s history of workfare stretches back to
the Elizabethan Poor Law Act 	 for example, which made provision for setting
poor people to work, while the New Poor Law of 
 discouraged the provision of
relief to anyone who refused to enter a workhouse.
. The notion that welfare is ‘passive’ can be problematic. For example, while ‘uncon-
ditional’ unemployment benefits may be termed ‘passive’, we should not forget that
out-of-work benefits have helped to support livelihoods and have helped workers in
their search for new employment.
. For example, single parents with young children in receipt of JSA must now
actively look for paid work when their youngest child reaches the age of five (until
 the age threshold was  years).

. Since 	, JSA has been Britain’s main subsistence benefit for unemployed
people. The vast majority (about  per cent) of all unemployed benefit claimants
are in receipt of income-based (means-tested) JSA benefits, and the rest are in
receipt of contributory-based JSA. Benefit levels in 
 for both types of JSA were
identical, at £.
 a week for a single adult over  (or £. for young adults
aged 	–
) they are well below the official poverty line (Cribb et al. ), and
£.
 a week only amounts to about one-third of what the British public believe
is the basic minimum needed to live on (Davis et al. 
). Welfare systems partly
‘decommodify labour’ (thus minimizing or abolishing labour market dependency)
and policymakers emphasize ‘moral hazard’, suggesting workers may prefer to opt
out of employment altogether if income replacement rates and social benefits
provide a decent standard of living.
. Available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ashe/annual-survey-of-hours-and-
earnings/index.html (accessed  June 
).
	. For some of the latest policy announcements on UK welfare reform, see the
Chancellor’s speech at the Conservative Party Conference on  September 
for details about ‘work for benefit’, http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/
///george-osborne-s-conference-speech-in-full (accessed  June 
),
©  John Wiley & Sons Ltd
SOCIAL POLICY & ADMINISTRATION, VOL. 49, NO. 7, DECEMBER 2015
		

and Iain Duncan Smith, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,  Party
Conference speech, http://www.conservativepartyconference.org.uk/Speeches/
_Iain_Duncan_Smith.aspx (accessed  June 
).
. For example, Article  of the 
 UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
states that, ‘everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security’, and
Article  states that, ‘everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the[ir] health and well-being’, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/
(accessed  June 
).
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